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MORTGAGES -

RECENT DECISIONS

RECORDING -

EFFECT OF A MORTGAGE RECORDED IN

BooK OF DEEDS - An interest in certain land was mortgaged by the owners to the plaintiff in October, 1933. This same interest was subjected to a lien
of certain judgment creditors recovered against the owners in July, 1936.
The defendant, as assignee of the claim of the judgment creditors, claimed
priority over the mortgagee by reason of the fact that the mortgage was delivered to the register for the purpose of being recorded as a deed and was in
fact so recorded. The judgment creditors disclaimed all notice of this prior
mortgage. The statutes of New Jersey provide that mortgages should be registered in the book provided for that purpose; another section states that every
mortgage for lands "shall be void and of no effect against a subsequent judgment creditor ••• unless such mortgage shall • • • be recorded • • . as hereinbefore provided. • • ." 1 In an action by the plaintiff for a partition of real
estate and to collect the proceeds of the foreclosure, held, a subsequent judgment
creditor is not charged with constructive notice of a mortgage recorded in the
deeds register and such mortgage is completely void as to him. Hadfield v.
Hadfield, 128 N. J. Eq. 510, 17 A. (2d) 169 (1941).
Assuming a jurisdiction which affords protection against a prior unrecorded
mortgage to a judgment creditor who has recorded his judgment,2 the problem
arises whether such a person will be given priority when there has been a mistake in recording the earlier instrument.8 Where the grantee or mortgagee has
made the mistake, as in the present case, undoubtedly no court would protect him
against the prior lien. But where the recording officer is responsible for the
THE

1

N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 46:17-2, 46:17-3.1, 46:17-4.

2

A judgment creditor is not a purchaser under common law because he does not

give value for or in reliance on the property. Therefore a prior mortgage is good as to
him. l JoNEs, MORTGAGES, 8th ed., 770 (1928). The recording acts do not change the
common law in this respect unless they expressly protect a judgment lien. In many
jurisdictions the judgment lien is so protected.
8 Examples of such mistakes in the recording of mortgages are illustrated by the
following cases: the date of the mortgage was omitted in the record in Grove v. Great
Northern Loan Co., 17 N. D. 352, I 16 N. W. 345 (1908); the time of maturity of
the note secured was left out in Bank of Lexington v. Cooper, l 1 5 Miss. 782, 76
So. 659 (1917); the sum secured by the mortgage was not mentioned in Merrick v.
Wallace, 19 Ill. 486 {1858), and Bedford v. Tupper, 30 Hun. (37 N. Y. S. Ct.) 174
(1883).
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error, courts are divided as to who must suffer the loss. Some courts hold that
the grantee or mortgagee by lodging the instrument with the proper officer
acquits himself of all responsibility as to the actual recording, and from that
time on a subsequent purchaser or creditor is deemed to have constructive notice
of the instrument, no matter what the record shows.4 This view is usually
predicated upon statutory language which provides that an instrument shall be
effectively recorded from the time that it is filed or deposited for record. The
better reasoning supports the view that subsequent purchasers are bound only
by what the record displays. 5 This view is based on the theory that the recording officer is an agent for the party recording and the latter is in a position to see
that the instrument is properly recorded, whereas a subsequent purchaser, no
matter how much diligence he shows, cannot ascertain the truth. 6 One type of
recording error deserves special attention. In some of the states the recording
statutes provide that all mortgages shall be recorded in separate books kept for
that purpose.7 If the mere filing of tjle instrument with the register of deeds
protects the mortgagee or grantee, then it will be immaterial to him that the
recording officer records the instrument in the wrong book. 8 But in many states
a record not made in the proper book does not operate as constructive notice.9
This rule would seem justifiable if a party looking up a mortgage would not be
4
5TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 1273 (1939); 1 JoNES, MoRTGAGEs,
8th ed., 904 (1928); Lewis v. Hinman, 56 Conn. 55, 13 A. 143 (1888); Kiser v.
Heuston, 38 Ill. 252 (1865); Hayden v. Peirce, 165 Mass. 359, 43 N. E. 119
(1896); Sinclair v. Slawson, 44 Mich. 123, 6 N. W. 207 (1880); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of New York v. Dake, 87 N. Y. 257 (1881); Green v. Garrington, 16 Ohio St.
548 (1866); Clader v. Thomas, 89 Pa. St. 343 (1879); Shove v. Larsen, 22 Wis.
142 (1867).
5
WALSH, MoRTGAGES 166 (1934); 1 JoNES, MoRTGAGEs, 8th ed., 903 (1928),
citing cases from twenty-three jurisdictions; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §
1273 (1939), also citing cases.
6
5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 1273 (1939). The recording officer
usually is personally liable in damages for errors and omissions. 1 J ONEs, MORTGAGES,
8th ed., 911 (1928). The main question is: to whom is he liable? If merely filing
the instrument is constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser or judgment creditor,
such party would be the party damaged and therefore the one who should recover. If
the instrument must be correctly filed to give notice, then the grantor or mortgagor
should recover.
7 California, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
and Texas. 1 JoNEs, MoRTGAGES, 8th ed., 756 (1928).
8
Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 74 A. 550 (1909); Cawthon v. Stearns Culver
Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738 (1910).
9
Kent v. Williams, 146 Cal. 3, 79 P. 527 (1905); Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal.
552, 63 P. 844 (1901); Baker v. Lee, 49 La. Ann. 874, 21 So. 588 (1897); Grand
Rapids National Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 107 N. W. 76 (1906); Deane v.
Hutchinson, 40 N. J. Eq. 83, 2 A. 292 (1885); Purdy v. Huntington, 42 N. Y. 334
(1870); Gillig v. Maass, 28 N. Y. 191 (1863); Van Thorniley v. Peters, 26 Ohio
St. 471 (1875); Calder v. Chapman, 52 Pa. St. 359 (1866); Knowlton v. Walker,
13 Wis. 264 (1860); Drake v. Reggel, IO Utah 376, 37 P. 583 (1894); Bernard v.
Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 108 P. 439 (1910).
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inclined to scrutinize the book of deeds. However, ordinarily the mortgagee
would consult the deeds book in order to make sure that the mortgagor had
good title and so would discover the mortgage instrument. Where the statute is
merely directory as to where a mortgage should be recorded, then a mortgage recorded in the deeds book would be valid. 10 A slightly more intricate problem arises
when the deed is absolute on its face but is intended only as a mortgage. Such an
instrument has been held void when recorded only in the book of deeds.11 But the
weight of authority seems to be that such recording is su.fficient.12 The courts justify the latter view by saying that one should know that a deed appearing to convey an absolute title might in fact convey a lesser interest.18 It is true that a prospective mortgagee might be considered to have adequate notice assuming he will
consult the book of deeds, for he can at least see that the prospective mortgagor
has not a clear title to the property. But to apply this reasoning to a purchaser
of the land from the mortgagee who had recorded the deed absolute would be fallacious. Such a purchaser could easily be misled, no matter how much diligence he
used, into buying the property from the mortgagee. thinking that he had an
absolute title, for no record discloses anything to the contrary.

Paul M. Oberndorf

10 Smith v. Smith, 13 Ohio St. 532 (1862); Haseltine v. Espey, 13 Ore. 301,
P. 423 (1886); Clader v. Thomas, 89 Pa. St. 343 (1879); Downing v. Glen
Rock Oil Co., 207 Pa. St. 455, 56 A. 995 (1904).
11 Ives v. Stone, 51 Conn. 446 (1883); Cordeviolle v. Dawson, 26 La. Ann.
534 (1874); Grand Rapids National Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 107 N. W. 76
(1906); Purdy v. Huntington, 42 N. Y. 334 (1870); Gregory v. Perkins, 15 N. C.
50 (1833); Williams v. Purcell, 45 Okla. 489, 145 P. n51 (1914); Calder v.
Chapman, 52 Pa. St. 359 (1866).
12 Kent v. Williams, 146 Cal. 3, 79 P. 527 (1905); Gibson v. Hough & Sons, 60
Ga. 588 (1878); DeWolf v. Strader, 26 Ill. 225 (1861); Clemons v. Elder, 9 Iowa
272 (1859); Young v. Thompson, 2 Kan. 78 (1863); Ing v. Brown, 3 Md. Ch. 521
(1850); Harrison v. Trustees of Phillips Academy, 12 Mass. 456 (1815); Marston v.
Williams, 45 Minn. n6, 47 N. W. 644 (1890); Grellet v. Heilshorn, 4 Nev. 526
(1869); Merchants'. State Bank of Fargo v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238, 103 N. W. 760
(1905); Kemper v. Campbell, 44 Ohio St. 210, 6 N. E. 566 (1886); Haseltine v.
Espey, 13 Ore. 301, IO P. 423 (1886); Kennard v. Mabry, 78 Tex. 151, 14 S. W.
272 (1890); Knowlton v. Walker, 13 Wis. 264 (1860).
18 Kennard v. Mabry, 78 Tex. 151, 14 S. W. 272 (1890).
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